Ownership Structure and Disclosure Quality: Case of Iran  by Sepasi, Sahar et al.
 Procedia Economics and Finance  36 ( 2016 )  108 – 112 
2212-5671 © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientifi c Journals Publisher
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(16)30021-1 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1st International Conference on Applied Economics and Business, ICAEB 2015 
Ownership Structure and Disclosure Quality: Case of Iran 
Sahar Sepasia,*, Morteza Kazempourb, Roya Mansourlakorajc 
aAssistant Prof., Faculty of Management & Economics, Tarbiat Modares University (TMU), Tehran, Iran 
bMSc of Accounting, Faculty of Management & Economics, Tarbiat Modares University (TMU), Tehran, Iran 
cMSc of Accounting, Faculty of Management & Economics, Islamic Azad university, branch of Nour. 
Abstract 
The paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and disclosure quality. The investigation has been 
performed using panel data procedure for a sample of 80 Iranian listed companies on the Tehran Stock exchange 
during 2010-2014. The license of the firms’ disclosure quality which is published by Tehran Stock Exchange is used 
to measure the disclosure quality, and for better understanding of the ownership structure, this structure is divided into 
two classes of government and managerial ownership. The results of the study revealed that managerial ownership 
has a negative and significant effect on disclosure quality, but no significant relationship was observed between 
governmental ownership and disclosure quality. The results show that the governmental ownership does not affect the 
quality of disclosure, meaning these companies have a low attention and concern on the quality of their disclosures. 
Adversely, private companies because of the need to absorb capital from market try to enhance the quality of their 
disclosures. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting disclosure is very important to all stakeholders; it provides them with the necessary information to 
reduce uncertainty and helps them to make suitable economic and financial decisions (Amer, et.al, 2013). The main 
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core of Agency Theory is that managers, as the agents of shareholders, may act in a way that does not result in 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders. Based on this theory, enough mechanisms of control and supervision should 
be established to reduce the contrast between the managers and the owners in a firm. One of these mechanisms is firm 
domination. If the mechanisms of firm domination work well, they will result in the reduction of opportunistic and 
jobbery behaviours of the manager and this can increase the quality of disclosure. Ownership structure (Governmental 
and managerial ownership) can be mentioned as one of the most important mechanisms of firm ownership. Therefore, 
it is expected that governmental investors will have more motivation to supervise the processes of firm’s disclosure. 
Therefore, firms can increase the expectations of state investors that are one of the most important beneficiaries in 
Iranian firms through increasing their disclosure quality. On the other hand, it seems that the firms which have very 
high management ownerships have lower disclosure quality compared to other firms. The reason for this fact could be 
that based on the Agency Theory, managers are trying to maximize their own expected desirability. Therefore, they 
need useful information which they can obtain it easily and will not be willing to disclose the information properly 
and comprehensively. Also, the firms which do not have main owner and their owners are scattered will seek to provide 
the information needs of users by disclosing high quality information. 
2. Literature review 
The amount of accuracy in information disclosure can affect decision making and prediction. Generally, the higher 
the quality and accuracy of information disclosure are, the better decision makings and predictions will be. Besides, 
high quality of information disclosure and information asymmetry causes more coordination between managers and 
investors. The more the asymmetry between the managers and investors is, the more the investors will expect 
efficiency of investment. Disclosure cases as the final outcome of accounting process and the main information source, 
which is highly considered and emphasized by the users of accounting information users, might be measured under 
the effects of accounting procedures of management selection. Selecting the accounting procedures and information 
disclosure might provide the opportunity for the manager to decide on the time of recognizing and measuring the costs 
and incomes. 
 As it is known, the standards of accounting have defined minimums for information disclosure. In addition, Stock 
Exchange has made the firms disclose more amount of information compared to the amount defined by the accounting 
standards with the purpose of supporting the investors and clarity in the market. The question is that what factors 
cause difference and improvement of disclosure quality of the firms? The existence of not very adaptable evidences 
related to the effects of ownership structure on disclosure in developing countries introduces some uncertainties about 
the type and extreme of this relationship in Iran with a developing economy. Decisions of financial disclosure of firms 
usually are not made in vacuum and financial reporting is one od the ways by which information is transferred and 
the combination of communication sources, quantity, and quality of disclosed information depends on many factors 
which need to be investigated in order to have a general understanding of disclosure procedures. Experimental 
evaluation of of the variables affecting the disclosure quality provides an opportunity which helps to improve the 
disclosure quality. Investigating the annual reports of the firms shows that the disclosure quality is different in such 
reports and the difference of firms’ disclosure is to a large extent a function of the type of relationship between 
ownership and management of the firm in different aspects and also their assessment about disclosing information for 
the purposes of investment.  
In a study under the title of “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure”, Eng and Mak (2003) have shown 
that the less the management ownership and the more firm ownership are, voluntary disclosure of information will 
increase and the ownership of main shareholders does not have a meaningful relationship with disclosure and the more 
the percentage of non-responsible managers is, voluntary disclosure will decrease. After analyzing the data, Huafang 
and Jianguo (2007) concluded that there is a reverse relationship between main ownership and te amount of 
information disclosure. 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) reported clear evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of 
nonexecutive directors on the board. Firms that have a nonexecutive chairman make greater voluntary disclosures 
than other firms. Also, their results showed there is no association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
ownership structure. 
 Abdullah (2008) found that institutional ownership is an important factor that could assist companies to perform 
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effectively, he also found the companies tend to be audited by the Big 4 if the level of institutional ownership 
increases. 
Gerald and Sidney (2010) examine the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and levels of family 
ownership and board independence including the influence of an independent chairman. the results show that at 
moderate to low levels of family shareholding (25% or less), the convergence of interest effect is dominant and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure is relatively low. At higher levels of family shareholding (more than 25%), the 
entrenchment effect dominates and is associated with higher voluntary disclosure. In addition, the results show that 
the appointment of an independent chairman is positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Samaha et al. (2012), examined the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes on the extent 
of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. Their results showed that the extent of governance disclosure 
is lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder 
ownership and increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and also firm size. 
 Alves et al. (2012), examined the relations between corporate governance variables and voluntary disclosure in 
Portugal and Spain. Their results indicated that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure are firm size, growth 
opportunities, organizational performance, board compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. Motavassel 
et al. (2013) concluded that there is not any meaningful relationship between the features of corporate governance and 
the quality of information disclosure. 
3. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure quality. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and disclosure quality. 
4. Research Methodology 
The statistical population of this research included firms accepted and operating in the Tehran Stock Exchange 
(TSE) over the period 2010-2014. The data was collected from the TSE database available. The research sample is 80 
companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. 
 
ܸܦܫܵ݅ǡ ݐ ൌ ߚͲ ൅ ߚͳܩܱܹܰ݅ǡ ݐ ൅ ߚʹܯܱܹܰ݅ǡ ݐ ൅ ߚ͵ܵܫܼܧ݅ǡ ݐ 
(1) 
x GOWNi,t: Government ownership will be measure by percentage of shares owned by government to total 
number of shares issued, following (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al, 2008). 
x MOWNi,t: Management ownership will be measure by percentage of shares owned by management to total 
number of shares issued. 
x Sizei,t : logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. 
5. Findings  
The co-linearity of independent variables investigated by SPSS before testing hypotheses. Results showed that all 
condition index values are less than 15; implying that there is no co-linearity between variables. Then, F-Limer test 
was used by applying E-Views 7 software. As it can be observed in table 1, its value is equal to 0.051 indicating that 
data are pooled. Durbin-Watson statistic is also 1.80 showing no autocorrelation.  
         Table 1: Results of F-Limier test 
Model VDIS=β0 +  β1 GOWN + β2 MOWN + β3 FSIZE 
 
Test type Statistic d.f Prob. 
F-Limier 29/13 (5/681) 0/051 
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                    Table 2: Pooled data regression model 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Prob. 
C 95/30 10/52 0/000 
Govermental ownership 2/12 0/45 0/600 
Manegerial ownership -16/45 -4/88 0/000 
Firm size 2/15 3/50 0/000 
R2 Adjusted R2 Drbin-Watson F- Statictic 
0/551 0/531 1/80 0/000 
 
Since the value of T statistic is higher than 5% error, it can be concluded that there is not any meaningful 
relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure quality. Therefore, the first hypothesis is rejected; and 
according to the possibility of T statistic related to managerial ownership and the negative coefficient obtained, it 
can be concluded that there is a reverse and significant relationship between management ownership and disclosure 
quality which confirms the second hypothesis 
6. Conclusion 
One of the important aims of accounting is to make the accounting information useful in users’ decision making. 
Hence, the aims of accounting and financial reporting require that the related information be disclosed completely, 
appropriately, and fairly. Increase in the level of disclosure is very effective for the users who face problems in defining 
the future perspectives of the firm due to the existence of asymmetry between them and their managers and therefore, 
inappropriate selection -as a result of asymmetry- could be reduced. However, the important issue is the factors 
affecting the quality and level of firm’s disclosure. One of the important factors affecting information disclosure is 
ownership structure. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of ownership structure on quality of 
information disclosure in the firms’ accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange. After studying 80 firms which were accepted 
in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2014, the results revealed that there is a reverse relationship between 
managerial ownership and the quality of disclosure but no significant relationship was observed between state 
ownership and quality of disclosure. The results show that the governmental ownership does not affect the quality of 
disclosure, meaning these companies have a low attention and concern on the quality of their disclosure. Adversely, 
private companies because of absorbing capital from market try to enhance the quality of their disclosures. The result 
of this research is useful for investors and shareholders of state and private companies. Relation of other type of 
ownership like family ownership with quality of disclosure can be the done in future researches.  
References 
Abdullah, W.Z.W. (2008), "The Impact of Board Composition, Ownership and CEO Duality on Audit Quality: The Malaysian Evidence", 
Malaysian Accounting Review 7(2).17-28 
Alves H. Rodrigues A. M. & Canadas N. (2012). Factors influencing the different categories of voluntary disclosure in annual reports: An analysis 
for Iberian Peninsula listed companies. Tekhne, 10(1), 15-26 
Amer, A., Ravindran, P., & Mahmoud, A. (2013). The Impact of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Voluntary Disclosure in 
Annual Reports among Listed Jordanian Companies. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 129, 341 – 348 
Cheng, E. C. M., & Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 41(3), 262-289. 
Donnelly, R. & Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 16, 416–429 
Eng, L., & Mak, Y. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 325-345. 
Gerald, C., & Sidney, J.G. (2010). Family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 19, 93–109. 
Huafang, X., and Jianguo, Y. (2007). Ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from listed companies 
in China. Managerial Auditing Journal. 22 (6): 604-619. 
112   Sahar Sepasi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  36 ( 2016 )  108 – 112 
Motavassel, M., Ansari, J., Abdi, B. and Taghipour, S., (2013), Corporate governance attributes, audit quality and financial discourser quality: case 
of  Tehran Stock Exchange, Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 297-301. 
Rouf, A. (2011). Corporate characteristics, governance attributes and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh. African Journal of Business 
Management, 5 (19): 7836-7845. 
Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K. & Stapleton, P. (2012). The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing 
market: The case of Egypt. Advances in Accounting, 28(1), 168-178 
Wang, K., Sewon, O., & Claiborne, M. (2008). Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: Evidence from 
China. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 77(1), 14-30. 
 
